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This work provides a mathematical approach of the Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
and its implementation in a wireless network. FHE has been presented as the ”Holy Grail”
by the cryptographers. This special encryption scheme enables one to perform complex
operations(both addition and multiplication) on a cypher text without ever decrypting
the text. An immediate application is the delegated computation, an untrusted party
can process the data without endangering the privacy of the source and the integrity of
the data. The first FHE scheme was introduced in 2009, by Craig Gentry. His scheme
was based on the properties of rings especially on ideal lattices.As introduced by Gentry,
FHE was not practical due to the length of ciphertext (per bit encrypted) and the keys,
and its infeasible computational time. Many works have been done to make it somewhat
practical(Shai-Halevi(2010), Smart-Vercauteren(2011)).The proposed schemes were based
on algebra and number theory concepts. Following the idea of Smart-Vercauteren, and
the implementation of Michael Brenner we design an implementation for wireless network.
Such a system should allow operations on encrypted data that could result in reducing the
computation load and the size of the packets in a wireless network.The most challenging
part of this work will be to make the computational time of the FHE quasi real while
preserving its security scheme. Since the strength of the FHE comes from the hardness to
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approximate short vector problems on arbitrary lattices within a slightly super polynomial
factor, making that computational time logarithmic or less is quite challenging. This work
attempts to design and implement fully homomorphic encryption for wireless networks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Encryption is an ”efficient” and well-known way for preserving the privacy of sensitive
information sent through a network. The necessity for an encryption scheme allowing
total privacy of data has become of greatest interest among cryptographers over the last
few decades, due to recent development in the area of computer and mobile network.
People were seeking for an encryption scheme that could allow operations on a ciphertext
without any need to decrypting it first. In 1977, Rivest, Adleman and Shamir proposed
a scheme (RSA) in which given only the public key and the encryption of operands, one
could compute the encryption of their products. Therefore, the question of an encryption
scheme allowing both addition and multiplication on the ciphertext arose. More concretely,
was it possible to process encrypted data that is query it, write into it, and do any sort of
operations that can be expressed as a circuit? Such a scheme known as Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE)today, was introduced in 1978 by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzous. In
their paper, they considered a situation in which a loan company enlists the services of
a third-company to store and process its records. The loan company’s database contains
sensitive data and must be encrypted to ensure their privacy; so the third-party company
is storing encrypted data. Now, let assume the loan company would like to know how much
the average loan was or how many loans over 200 dollars were granted, but they don’t have
enough resources to compute such operations and need the help of the third-company to
process it. How could the company get those statistics without endangering the privacy of
the bank’s users? Delegating computations to an untrusted party, that is allowing it to carry
out extensive computation only on encrypted data, was the main goal of FHE. Nowadays
the range of its applications has increased. Many attempts to produce such an encryption
scheme have been made, but the real breakthrough came with Gentry in 2009. He proposed
the first FHE scheme (Gentry, 2009) using ideal lattices. Ideal lattices correspond to ideals
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in polynomial rings and they inherit natural additions and multiplications from the ring.
Gentry suggested a public-key encryption scheme where the public and private key were
respectively ”bad” and ”good” bases of an ideal lattice, and a small noise component was
added to the text to be encrypted. The main issues with Gentry’s scheme were the relatively
extended length of the generated ciphertext and the large size of the encryption/decryption
keys, both leading to an infeasible computational time. The practicability of FHE was
questioned aroused (Fan & Vercatauren, 2010) since computing homomorphically caused
the noise to increase leading to the failure of decryption. Since 2009, much research has
been conducted to make FHE practical. An attempt to solve the problem was to make
use of a somewhat homomorphic encryption leaving out the bootstrapping step, a partially
decryption of the ciphertext to reduce the noise like in Gentry’s scheme (Lauter et al., 2012).
But, this turns out to be suitable only for a limited number of applications like private
health care and online ads. In March 2012, a new somewhat homomorphic encryption
scheme was proposed by Yang and Xia. It reduced the key size from O(k7) to O(k3) based
on the approximate GCD problem, making it practical for cloud computing. In May 2012,
an efficient fully encryption scheme leading to a public key size of O(k) was proposed by
Brakersy and Vaikuntanathan. This encryption scheme is based on the learning with error
assumption (Brakersi et.al, 2012). In June 2012, Michael Brenner et al. implemented a
version of FHE based on Smart-Vercauteren approach (Brenner et al., 2012). The practical
FHE has led to a large number of applications in computer networks: secure multi party
computation (Kamara et al., 2012), private information retrieval (Dschai & Parski, 2010),
delegated computation (Chung & Kalai, 2010). In our work, we are going to follow the
implementation of Michael Brenner et.al, and use FHE for mobile wireless network, more
specifically for smart phones.
We would like to apply FHE to mobile crowd sensing with smart phones. Mobile phone
sensing is a new paradigm growing with the development of smart phones. Data are
collected from the users and are processed by an external party for different purposes namely
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traffic and weather monitoring. The challenge in this system is to preserve the privacy of the
source. Though,this could be done by encryption, still the integrity of the collected data
should be ensured. This means that after the encryption/decryption process, the result
should be as similar as possible to the original data. Solutions have been proposed to
address this issue ranging from PiRi, a privacy-aware framework for Participatory Sensing
systems (Kazemi & Shahabi, 2011) to protocols (Moffat et al., 2011). FHE has been left
out as a potential solution because of its complexity, but with its recent improvements
we would like to investigate if a suitable version of FHE designed specifically for mobile
networks can be derived from an existing practical FHE. Since many smart phone users
are reluctant to participate in crowd sensing because of the privacy issue, our aim in this
study is to provide the crowd sensing area with an efficient technique of users’ privacy and
data trustworthiness for the users.
Chapter 1 deals with cryptosystems settings. We will discuss security-related issues
of encryption schemes and provide examples of private and public cryptosystems as well
as their underlying security assumptions. This chapter also contains materials on groups,
integers and functions. The description of homomorphic encryption is provided as well and
is illustrated by two examples of additive and multiplicative homomorphic encryptions.
Chapter 2 deals with FHE. We will present the mathematical foundation of FHE:
rings, fields and lattices. Then we will discuss some problems classified as hard in Number-
theory and Algebra and being used as security assumptions for FHE encryption schemes.
We will finally present three different FHEs based on lattices, integers, and learning with
error.
Chapter 3 introduces our suggested algorithm. It is a combination of the three algo-
rithms above-mentioned. We will give a complete description of the scheme, generation of
the keys, encryption and decryption functions, verification of fully homomorphic properties
as well as security assumptions.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 BACKGROUND IN CRYPTOGRAPHY
This section will provide some basic knowledge about cryptography. We will explain
what is cryptography, why it is useful and provide some related vocabulary.
Alice and Bob are two friends and they would like to exchange messages over an insecure
channel. The channel is considered insecure whenever it is feasible for Trudy (an adversary)
to have access to the conversation. Since, they are aware of a potential eavesdropper, Trudy,
trying to break into their conversation, they decide to encrypt it. The goal of encryption
is to keep information secret from all, except to the authorized users. They might decide
to map every bit or set of bits of their conversation to another bit or set of bits. A simple
example would be the Caesar cipher. This encryption scheme is attributed to the emperor
Caesar; He used it to secretly transmit his strategy to his troops in the field. In the Caesar
cipher, each letter of a message is replaced with another letter of a fixed number of places
after it in the alphabet. Example Bob wants to send the word ATTACK to Alice, he
could chose to replace each letter by the third letter after it , so that A will be replaced by
D,etc... so that ATTACK will be send as DWWDFN. Alice would know she will have to
go back three letters to recover the original message.
We will call the original message(the one sent by Bob) a plaintext, and the encrypted
version received by Alice a ciphertext, and the shift by 3 the key. Cryptography is the
art and science of designing secure cryptosystems to guarantee ”secure” communication
over an insecure network. This mean,they should be guaranteed that after encrypting the
data, they could always and are the only one(s )to decrypt it (i.e to reverse the mapping.).
A cryptosystem is a quadruple S=(M,C,K,E ,D) such that :
1- M,C, and K are sets, where M is the message space (or ”plaintext” space), C is the
ciphertext space and K is the key space.
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2- E = {Ek|k ∈ K} is a family of functions Ek : M → C that are used for encryption and
D = {Dk|k ∈ K} is a family of functions Dk : C →M that are used for decryption.
3- For each key e ∈ K, there exists a key d ∈ K such that for each message m ∈ m:
Dd(Ee(m)) = m, where e and d are respectively called the encryption and decryption key.
Let consider our previous example: Alice and Bob, communicating over an insecure channel
and therefore using a cryptosystem S=(M,C,K,E ,D) as defined above. Let assume the
messages are distributed on M according to a probability distribution Prm(that may depend
on the language used). For each new message m, Alice chooses a new key from K that
is independent of the message to be encrypted (the key is usually generated before the
plaintext). The keys are distributed according to a probability distribution Prk on K. The
distributions Prm and Prk induce a probability distribution: PrM×K on M ×K. That is
for each message m ∈M and for each k ∈ K,
PrM×K = PrM(m)PrK(k)
is the probability that the message m is encrypted with the key k, where m and k are
independent. Then we have:
• For m ∈ M , let m denote the event {(m, k)|k ∈ K}. Then Pr(m) = PrM(m) is the
probability that the message m will be encrypted.
• For k ∈ K, let k denote the event {(m, k)|m ∈ M}. Then Pr(k) = PrK(k) is the
probability that the key k will be used.
• For c ∈ C, let c denote the event {(m, k)|Ek(m) = c}.
Then, Pr(m|c) is the probability that m is encrypted given that c is received.
Kerchoff’s principle: The security of a cryptosystem must not depend on the secrecy of
the system used. Rather, the security of a cryptosystem may depend only on the secrecy
of the keys used.
5
Definition 2.1.0.1. (Perfect secrecy)
A cryptosystem
S = (M,C,K, E ,D) is said to guarantee perfect secrecy,
iff ∀m ∈M, ∀c ∈ C,Pr(m|c) = Pr(m)
The perfect secrecy is the aim of any cryptosystem.
Theorem (Shannon)
Let S=(M,C,K,E ,D) be a cryptosystem with |C| = |K| and Pr(m) > 0 for each m ∈ M .
Then S guarantees perfect secrecy iff:
1-For each m ∈ M and for each c ∈ C, there exists a unique key k ∈ K with Ek(m) = c
and,
2- The keys in K are uniformly distributed.
According to the Kerchoff’s principle, in cryptography settings, provable inefficiency means
security: The security of current cryptosystems usually depends on the assumption that
certain problems from algebra and number theory are intractable. Thus, to describe such
cryptosystems and discuss related security issues, we need algebraic and number-theoretical
notions, and results. In the next section we will give some background on groups, integers
and present some related hard problems used in cryptography.
2.2 MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
This section will provide mathematical notions and useful theorems necessary to
clearly understand fully homomorphic encryption algorithms and their security assump-
tions. We will start by giving some algebraic and number theory foundation, then we will
discuss integers and theorems around them.
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2.2.1 Background in Algebra
Groups
Definition 2.2.1.1. A group G is a non-empty set (G, ∗) together with a binary operation
G×G→ G.
(α, β)→ α ∗ β, (closure of the group)such that the following holds:
a) Associativity
∀α, β, γ,∈ G : α ∗ (β ∗ γ) = (α ∗ β) ∗ γ
b) Existence of an identity element e
∃e ∈ G such that ∀α ∈ G : α ∗ e = e ∗ α = α. The identity element is unique.
c) Existence of an inverse element
∀α ∈ G, ∃α−1 ∈ G, such thatα ∗ α−1 = α−1 ∗ α = e
Example:
• Let define the group of plaintext (M, ⊕) where ⊕ is the XOR(Exclusive OR)or the
addition mod 2 and M={(0, 1)k} where k is a positive integer.
Let recall the logical table for XOR
⊕ 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
Claim M is a group under ⊕, and we will call it he group of plaintexts under addi-
tion.
Proof:
* Associativity
Let m1,m2,m3 ∈ Z2, we have:
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m1 m2 m3 m1 ⊕ (m2 ⊕m3) (m1 ⊕m2)⊕m3
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
Notice that m1 ⊕ (m2 ⊕m3) = (m1 ⊕m2)⊕m3, thus the associativity is satisfied.
* Identity element is 0
Notice that 0⊕ 0 = 0 and 1⊕ 0 = 1.
* Inverse element
0⊕ 0 = 0 so that 0 is the inverse of 0 and 1⊕ 1 = 0 so that 1 is the inverse of 1, every
element of M has an inverse in M. We can conclude that (M,⊕) is a group.
• Is (Z2, ·) a group, where · is the multiplication mod 2?
Let recall
· 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
We notice that we have an identity element 1, but not all element has an inverse for
instance 0, thus (Z2, ·) is not a group
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Definition 2.2.1.2. A semi group is an algebraic structure consisting of a set together
with an associative binary operation
(Z2, ·) is a semi-group, and since it has an identity element it is referred to as monoid.
The requirement for cryptography settings is the closure of the groups, associativity and
the existence of the identity element, so we will be working with monoids and groups.
2.2.2 Functions
Let recall that a binary relation from a non-empty set A to a set B is any subset of
A × B, where A×B = {(a, b)|a ∈ A and b ∈ B}.
Definition 2.2.2.1. A function f is a binary relation between a set A( set of inputs ) and
a set B (valid outputs ). Each input has exactly one output. In other words if (a,b1) ∈ f
and (a,b2) ∈ f, then b1 = b2.
Let M, C, K be respectively the sets of plaintexts, ciphertexts, and keys then we define:
Encrypt:= EK :M ×K → C
(m, e) 7→ c,
Decrypt:= DK : C ×K →M
(c, d) 7→ m,
The functions Encrypt and Decrypt should both be easy to compute, and moreover should
guarantee the perfect secrecy that is we must have ∀ m ∈ M, d,d’ ∈ K with d 6= d′
Decrypt(Encrypt(m,e),d’) 6= m
2.2.3 Homomorphisms
Definition 2.2.3.1. A homomorphism is a mapping φ between two groups (G,♦) and
(H, ∗) such that φ (x ♦ y)=φ(x) ∗ φ(y) for x,y ∈ G and φ(x),φ(y) ∈ H. Such a function φ
is called a homomorphic function.
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Example: Let define the function φ :M → C, and φ(m) = me where e is an integer.
We easily verify that φ(m1 ·m2) = (m1 ·m2)e = m1e ·m2e = φ(m1) · φ(m2)
Definition 2.2.3.2. A multiplicative(resp. additive) homomorphic function is a homo-
morphic function with respect to multiplication (resp. addition), i.e φ(x♦y) = φ(x) · φ(y)
( resp. φ(x♦y) = φ(x) + φ(y)), for x, y ∈ G and φ(x), φ(y) ∈ H.
Following definition 1.2.3.2,
An encryption scheme would be said to be additively homomorphic if the following holds:
(i) Decrypt (c1 +C c2)= Decrypt(c1) +P Decrypt(c2) for ciphertexts c1 and c2
(ii) Encrypt(m1) +C Encrypt(m2) ”is like” Encrypt(m1 +P m2) where m1 and m2 are
two plaintexts.
Similarly, an encryption scheme would be said to be multiplicatively homomorphic if
we have:
(i) Decrypt (c1 ×C c2)= Decrypt(c1) ×P Decrypt(c2) for ciphertexts c1 and c2
(ii) Encrypt(m1) ×C Encrypt(m2) ”is like” Encrypt(m1 ×P m2) where m1 and m2 are
two plaintexts.
Earlier homomorphic schemes were homomorphic with respect to either addition or mul-
tiplication but not to both at the same time. Before going into details of homomorphic
encryptions, it is necessary to give some background on integers, since most cryptographic
security assumptions rely on hardness of some mathematical problems related to integers.
The next section provides some useful results and theorems which are essential for cryp-
tosystems.
2.2.4 Background on integers
Most encryption schemes rely on the properties of integers to provide encryption and
decryption algorithms as well as ensuring the security of the scheme. It is important to
present some useful properties of integers.
10
Definition 2.2.4.1. Let S be a set , a relation R, a and b ∈ S. R is an equivalent relation
on S if the following properties hold:
(i) Reflexivity aRa
(ii) Symmetry If aRb ⇒ bRa
(iii)Transitivity If aRb and bRc ⇒ aRc
We usually denote R by ∼
The equivalence class of a under ∼, denoted by [a] is defined as [a]={b ∈ A|a ∼ b}
Divisibility
For every two integers a and b with b6= 0 a =r+qb with r < b where r is the remainder of
the division of a by b.
Definition 2.2.4.2. We say b divides a if r=0, i.e a=qb, b is called a divisor of a; and a
is called a multiple of b. We denote by [0] the class of integers for which the remainder
of the division by n is 0 and by [1] the class of integers for which the remainder of the
division by n is 1. These equivalence classes are called residue classes modulo n.
Definition 2.2.4.3. ”a is congruent to b modulo n” denoted a≡ b mod n iff a-b is
divisible by n.
Let show that congruence is an equivalence relation.
1- Reflexive property : a≡ a mod n since a-a=0 is divisible by n.
2- Symmetric property: if a≡ b mod n, then b≡ a mod n, since if a-b is divisible by n
then b-a=-(a-b) is divisible by n.
3-Transitive property: if a≡ b mod n and b≡ c mod n, then a≡ c mod n since
a− b
n
= q1, where q1 is an integer, and also
b− c
n
= q2, where q2 is an integer, then
a− b
n
+
b− c
n
= q1 + q2 =
a− c
n
⇒ a− c
n
= q1 + q2 where q1 + q2 is an integer
We denote by Zn={[0],[1],[2],...[n-1]} and by Zn2={[0],[1],[2],...[n2 − 1]} .
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Definition 2.2.4.4. Let a ∈ Zn, a has an inverse in Zn if ∃b ∈ Zn such that a·b = 1 mod n.
We denote by Z∗n ={a ∈ Zn/∃b ∈ Zn a · b = 1 mod n}.
Definition 2.2.4.5. The greatest common divisor (gcd) of a and b , denoted by
gcd(a,b) or simply (a,b) is a positive number d such that d/a and d/b and if x is any
integer such that x/a and x/b then x/d .
The gcd (a,b) always exists and is unique.
Theorem: (Bezout’s theorem) Let a and b two nonnegative integers, a and b are
relatively prime if ∃ u, v ∈ Z such that au+bv=1.
Proof
Let S={au+ bv > 0 a,b ∈ N}. There exists a least element d ∈ S such that au+bv=d.
* S ⊆ N⇒ S 6= O
* We want to show that d=1
d = au1+bv1 (1), let consider the Euclidean division of a by d, a= dq + r (2) with 0 ≤ r < d
(3).
(1) in (2)⇒ a= (au1 + bv1)q + r
⇒ a - au1q - bv1q= a(1-u1q)- b(v1q)=r ⇒ r=au′1 + bv′1 ⇒ r ∈ S and r < d (from (3))
which is a contradiction, so r must be 0, thus d divides a.
We apply a similar reasoning for b, so d divides b and d divides both a and b.
It follows
d
d
=
a
d
u1 +
b
d
v1 ⇒ 1= a’u1 +b’v1 (a’ and b’ ∈ Z since d divides a and d divides
b).
1= a’u1 +b’v1 ⇒ 1∈ S and 1 ≥ d (since d is the least element of S), so finally we have d=1.
Definition 2.2.4.6. The least common multiple (lcm) of a and b, denoted by
lcm(a,b) is a positive number l such that a/l and b/l and if a/x and b/x then l/x.
Note: The lcm of two positive integers always exists and is unique.
Definition 2.2.4.7. A prime number is a positive integer greater than 1 that has no
positive divisors other than 1 and itself.
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Definition 2.2.4.8. a and b are said to be coprime or relatively prime if their only
common divisor is 1.
Definition 2.2.4.9. The Euler totient function φ(n) is the number of integers less than or
equal to n and which are relatively prime to n.
Example: Let calculate φ(6), 1,2,3,4,5 are integers less than 6 but only 1 and 5 are
relatively prime to 6, thus φ(6) = 2
Theorem : Let φ(n) be the Euler totient function and n be an integer. Then φ(n) has
the following properties:
1- φ is a multiplicative function : if m and n are relatively prime then φ(mn) = φ(m)φ(n)
2- For p prime and k ≥ 1 where k is an integer : φ(pk) = (p− 1)pk−1.
3- φ(nk) = nk−1φ(n) Theorem: Fermat’s little theorem
For any prime p, and any integer a 6= 0 (mod p), we have ap−1 ≡ 1 mod p
Definition 2.2.4.10. The Carmichael’s function For a positive integer n, λ(n) denotes the
least positive integer t such that mt ≡ 1 mod n for all integers m with gcd(m,n)=1. λ(n)
as defined above is called the Carmichael function.
Example Let compute λ(6). We have gcd(1,6)=gcd(5,6)=1, then we have 1n ≡ 1 mod 6
for n ≥ 1, and 52 ≡ 1 mod 6, and since we are looking for the least integer, we will set n=2
and thus λ(6) = 2
This section provides very important notions to understand the mathematical foundation
of Paillier cryptosystem.
2.2.5 Integer factorization problem
Definition 2.2.5.1. A composite number n is a positive integer n > 1 such that n is not
prime i.e n can be divided evenly by other numbers (other than 1 and itself).
Definition 2.2.5.2. Let N be a composite integer. There exists integers u,v such that
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N=u · v and such that both u, v > 1.
u and v are called factors.
Definition 2.2.5.3. Computational Integer factorization. Given an integer N and an in-
teger M with 1 ≤M ≤ N , does N have a factor d with 1 < d < M ?
When the numbers are very large, no efficient integer factorization algorithm is publicly
known. Not all numbers of a given length are equally hard to factor. The hardest instances
of these problems are semi-primes, the product of two prime numbers, when they are both
large, randomly chosen and about the same size.
In the following section we will consider n=pq where p and q are prime numbers, then
φ(n) = φ(pq) = φ(p)φ(q) and λ(n) = lcm(p−1, q−1) where φ(n) and λ(n) are respectively
the Euler totient function and the Carmichael’s function.
The composite residue problem
Let recall that Z∗n2={ a∈ Zn2/∃ b∈ Zn2 , a· b ≡ 1 mod n2}.
Let g be some element of Z∗n2 and denote by εg the integer valued function defined by:
εg(x,y)
Zn × Z∗n → Z∗n2
(x, y) 7→ gx · yn mod n2
We denote by Bα ⊂ Z∗n2 the set of elements of order nα and by B their disjoint union
Definition 2.2.5.4. A number z is said to be a n-th residue modulo n2 if there exists
a number y ∈ Z∗n such that z ≡ yn (mod ) n2.
Definition 2.2.5.5. Assume that g ∈ B . For w ∈ Z∗n2 , n-th residuosity class of w
with respect to g the unique integer x ∈ Z∗n such that εg(x, y) = w.
Definition 2.2.5.6. A composite residuosity class problem is the computational class
problem defined as follows: given w∈ Z∗n2 and g ∈ B, compute [[w]]g, where [[w]]g
=
L(wλ mod n2)
L(gλ mod n2))
=
wλ mod (n2)− 1
gλ mod (n2)− 1 .
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2.3 MORE ON CRYPTOGRAPHY
Alice and Bob (from the section 1) wants their conversation to remain secret from the
eavesdropper Trudy, so they mapped the real conversation into another one. This mapping
protects them from any intruder, now the mapping has to be easier to reverse for Alice
(assuming that Bob is the sender). There is one big issue associated to the mapping, the
way of reversing it, has to be known by each protagonists but remain unknown by Alice
and Bob. From our previous example(see section 1), how Bob would tell Alice to replace
the letter by the one in the third position above it?
An immediate solution would be for Alice and Bob to change their keys in person and
use the same key for all their conversations. In the reality, there might be no possibility
for Alice and Bob to communicate in person (that’s the main reason why we assume they
communicate through a network), so practically how could they agree on the keys? Would
they use the same key for encryption and decryption?
2.3.1 Symmetric-key cryptography
Definition
An encryption scheme is said to be symmetric if a secret key k ∈ K is shared by
the sender and the receiver, i.e k=e=d
The Caesar cipher, mentioned in section 1 is an example of a symmetric-key encryption.
In our example the shared key is 3, and the encryption function is c=m+3, while the
decryption function is m=c−3
Example of a symmetric-key encryption scheme
AES
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2.3.2 Public-key or asymmetric key cryptography
Definition
An encryption scheme is said to be asymmetric if a public key e ∈ K used by the
sender to encrypt the message and a secret key d ∈ K used by the receiver to decrypt the
message, i.e e 6= d .
An analogy to the asymmetric cryptography is that everyone can send a letter to Alice
(using her mailing address, it is publicly known), but only Alice can read the letter (she is
the only one to have the key of her mailbox).
We will present two examples of public-key encryptions which happen to be homomorphic
also.
2.3.3 RSA
Rivest Shamir and Adleman (RSA) is a public encryption created in 1977 by Ron
Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman at MIT. The security of the scheme is based on
the difficulty of factoring large integers. By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, every
positive integer has a unique prime factorization. The most difficult integers to factor in
practice are those that are products of two large primes of close size. Another interesting
property of RSA is its multiplicative homomorphism.
Let recall that a scheme is multiplicative homomorphic if for a plaintext m=m1 ×M m2
Decrypt(Encrypt(m))=Decrypt(Encrypt(m1 ×P m2))=Decrypt(c1 ×C c2)= m1 ×M m2.
In simpler words, that is given only the public key and the encryption of m1 and m2, one
can compute the encryption of m1 ×M m2
Description of the RSA cryptosystem
We will assume Bob and Alice are communicating, and Alice is sending a message to Bob.
Step 1: KeyGen (Generation of the keys)
- Input: Bob chooses two large distinct prime numbers p, q
Then he computes n=pq and φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
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He chooses e such that 1 < e < φ(n), gcd(e,φ(n)) = 1
Finally he determines the inverse element of e mod φ(n), i.e the unique number d such that
1 < d < (mod φ)(n) and e · d = 1 (mod φ)(n)
e and n are called respectively the encryption and the decryption exponents
- Output: public and private(secret) keys (pk,sk)
Bob’s public key is pk=(e,n), and his secret key is sk=d
Now, Alice knows Bob,s public key, she will use that to encrypt a message and send it to
him.
Step 2: Encrypt (m, pk)
- Input: plaintext m ∈ Zn and public key pk=(e,n)
Alice wants to send m∈ Zn
She computes c = E(n,e)(m) where E(n,e)(m) = m
e (mod n)∀m ∈ Zn
- Output: ciphertext c ∈ Zn
Now Alice sends c to Bob, Bob will receive c and will apply the decryption function to
recover m.
Step 3: Decrypt(c,sk)
- Input: ciphertext c ∈ Zn and secret key sk =d
He computes Dd(c) = c
d (mod n)
med = med
= m1+k(p−1)(q−1)
= m(mp−1)k(q−1)
Thenmed = m (mod p) and if p does not divide m, then we havemp−1 = 1 (mod p)(1)
(by Fermat little theorem), by a symmetric argument we show that med = m (mod q) (2).
Since p and q are distinct primes, from (1) and (2)we have med = m (mod p)
- Output: m ∈ Zn
Multiplicative homomorphic property of RSA
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Claim: RSA is multiplicatively homomorphic i.e Enc(m1) ×c Enc(m2)=Enc(m1 ×p
m2)
Proof Let consider the groups (M,·) and (C,·) to be respectively the groups of plaintext,
and ciphertext. Let recall the encryption function:
(M, ·)→ (C, ·)
m 7→ me (mod n)
Let m ∈ M such that m = m1 ·m2 where m1,m2 ∈M ,
We have
Enc(m1) · Enc(m2) = m1e (mod n) ·m2e (mod n)
= m1 ·m2e (mod n)
= me (mod n)
= Enc(m)
Bob would like to send a message to Alice, for instance w (the ascii code is 119). He wants
Alice to be the only person able to read the message.
1- He chooses two (large) distinct primes number p and q at random
p=29 and q=31
2- He computes the RSA modulus n=pq
n=31 × 29=899
3-He computes φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
φ(n) = 28× 30 = 840
4-He selects a random integer e such that gcd(e,φ(n)) = 1
we choose e to be 11 since gcd(11,840)=1
5-He computes the unique integer d such that ed mod φ(n) = 1
we have 11d mod 840 = 1⇒ d = 611.
6- The public key is (e,n), the private key is (d,n)
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(11,899) is the public key and (611,840) is the private key.
Step 2: Encrypt
- Input: plaintext p and public key pk
- Output:ciphertext c, c = pe mod n
- Function: Encrypt (p, pk)
Bob sends to Alice c=11911 mod 899 = 595
Step 3: Decrypt
- Input: ciphertext and secret key sk
- Output: plaintext p, p = cd mod n
- Function: Decrypt (c, sk)
Alice computes p = 595611 mod 899 = 119 and recovers the original message
Evaluate
Let consider a plaintext m = m1 × m2. We have c = me mod n = m1 ×m2e mod n =
m1
e ×m2e mod n = m1e mod n×m2e mod n = c1 × c2.
Let consider a ciphertext c which is such that c = c1 × c2, P = c1 × c2d mod n =
(c1
d × c2d) mod n = c1d mod n× c2d mod n = m1 ×m2
Paillier cryptosystem
It was invented in 1999 by Pascal Paillier. It is a public-key crypto-system based on
composite degree residue classes. The security of this scheme is ensured by the hardness of
computing the n-th residue classes i.e given a composite n ( n=pq where p and q are large
prime numbers) and an integer z it is hard to decide whether z is a n-residue modulo n2 or
not, i.e whether ∃ y such that z ≡ yn (mod ) n2. Moreover,Paillier cryptosystem is an
additive homomorphic cryptosystem.
Let recall that a scheme is additive homomorphic if for a plaintext p=p1 +P
p2 we have Encrypt(p)=Encrypt(p1 +P p2)=Encrypt(p1) +Encrypt(p2) and De-
crypt(Encrypt(p))=p1+C p2. That is given only the public key and the encryption of m1
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and m2, one can compute the encryption of m1+M m2. Notice that we don’t need to know
the original message, and such a scheme is useful if the cost to compute Encrypt(m1) and
Encrypt(m2)is less than computing Encrypt(m1)+C Encrypt(m2).
In this section we will describe the Paillier’s scheme and illustrate it by an example.
Description of the Paillier’s scheme
The Paillier crypto system works as follows: Bob wants to send a message to Alice.
Step 1: KeyGen (Generation of the keys)
- Input: Two large prime numbers p, q ∈ N
Compute n=pq
Choose g ∈ Z∗n2 such that gcd(L(gλ (mod n2)), n) = 1 with L(u)=u−1n
- Output: public and private(secret) keys (pk,sk)
pk=(n,g), sk=(p,q)
Step 2: Encrypt (m, pk)
- Input: plaintext m ∈ Zn and pubblic key pk=(n,g)
Choose r∈ Z∗n
Compute c= gmrn (mod n2)
- Output: ciphertext c ∈ Zn2
Step 3: Decrypt(c,sk)
- Input: ciphertext c ∈ Zn2 and secret key sk =(p,q)
Compute m=L(c
λ (mod n2)
L(gλ (mod n2)
(mod n)
- Output: m ∈ Z∗n
Additively homomorphic property of the Paillier’s cryptosystem
Claim: Paillier’s cryptosystem is additively homomorphic i.e Enc(m1) +c
Enc(m2)=Enc(m1 +p m2)
Proof Let consider the groups (M,+) and (C,·) to be respectively the groups of plaintext,
and ciphertext. Let recall the encryption function:
Enc(m) : (M,+) → (C,·)
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m 7→ c=gmrn mod n2
Let m1,m2 be two plaintexts, then we have Enc(m1) · Enc(m2)=(gm1r1n mod n2)
·(gm2r2n mod n2) =gm1+m2r1r2n mod n2 since r1, r2 ∈ Zn → r1 · r2 ∈ Zn, let r=r1r2,
so we have Enc(m1) · Enc(m2)=gm1+m2rn mod n2=Enc(m1 +m2), thus Paillier cryptosys-
tem is an additively homomorphic.
Example: Bob wants to send a message to Alice. He will like to use the Paillier encryption
scheme. In the following example we illustrate the steps.
1- Bob chooses two large prime numbers randomly and independently of
each other such that gcd(pq,(p-1)(q-1))=1.
Bob chooses for instance p=31 q=17; then he computes n=pq=527 and t (p-1)(q-1)=480
and he checks that gcd (527, 480)=1
2- Then he computes n=pq and λ=lcm(p-1,q-1)
n= pq= 527 and λ= lcm(30,16)= 240
3- He selects a random integer where g ∈ Z∗n2 and he makes sure that n divides the order of
g, by checking if he can find µ = (L(gλ mod n2))
−1
mod n where the function L is defined
as ∀u ∈ Sn, L(u)=u−1n with Sn={ u ≤ n2 | u ≡ 1mod n}.
In other words we can set g=n+1, λ = φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1) and µ = φ−1(n) mod n.
He selects g=1055
The public key pk is (n,g) so pk=(527,1055)
The private key sk is (p,q)=(31,17)
The first step is completed,we have computed the keys. Now let assume Bob wants to send
m=50 , he chooses r=35 .
c=10555035527 (mod 5272)=165122
Now let assume Bob doesn’t have enough resources to compute m=50, so he writes
m=m1 +m2=50 with m1 =34, and m2= 16. He also chooses r1=5 and r2=7.
He computes c1 and c2 and sends it to Alice. c1 = 1055
345527 (mod 5272)=88220
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c2 = 1055
167527 (mod 5272)=8760
Alice will receive c1 and c2 and will compute c1 · c2 = 88220× 8760 (mod 5272)=165122.
The second step is completed, Bob has encrypted the message and has send it to Alice.
Alice will use her secret key to decrypt the received message and recover the original mes-
sage. she will compute: m=
L(165122240 (mod 5272)
L(1055240 (mod 5272)
(mod 527)=50
2.4 TOWARDS FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Earlier homomorphic encryption schemes were partially homomorphic, they were ei-
ther additive or multiplicative.The idea of an encryption scheme allowing one to perform
complex mathematical operations on a cipher text without ever decrypting the text was
introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978. Many attempts to produce such an
encryption scheme have been made, but the real breakthrough came with Gentry in 2009.
Fully homomorphic encryption is considered as the ”Holy grail” by cryptographers due to
the numerous applications it can lead to. Let take a practical example, there is an on-
line software you can use to evaluate your insurance premium. The required inputs are
your bank information, credit information, age, and some other sensitive information and
you don’t feel comfortable sending those information in clear through the network. Now,
somebody assure you that, there is no need for you to send those data in clear, that you
just have to encrypt your data(he has zero-knowledge of your data), and he will compute
the function to evaluate your premium and would send you the encrypted result, and you
again will be the only one to access your result. Among other things, a fully homomor-
phic encryption (FHE) scheme allows one to perform non-interactive secure computation,
and in many applications this is crucial. The classic example is cloud computing: if you
don’t trust your cloud provider with your data, you are in trouble: either you have to
give away your private data in clear (running the risk that the cloud provider looks into
possibly confidential data), or you have to encrypt the data before uploading it (losing the
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advantages of having the cloud computing for you). Another example is encrypted a Spam
filter: you like that your mailbox is not filled with junk, but you might not be happy about
Google/Microsoft/etc. reading the contents of all your email.
In the next chapter we will present some fully homomorphic encryption schemes along
with their mathematical underlying structures and security assumptions.
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CHAPTER 3
FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
3.1 EVOLUTION OF FULLY HO-
MOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION SCHEMES(FHE): FROM THE FIRST
FHE TO PRACTICAL FHE
The need for more and more secure cryptosystems has increased drastically with tech-
nology, and in 1978, the idea of privacy homomorphism (today known as Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption (FHE)) was introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Dertouzous. That
special encryption scheme should allow an unlimited chaining of algebraic operations, that
means an arbitrary number of additions and multiplications can be applied to encrypted
operands. The underlying question was to find if there was an encryption function such
that both Encrypt(x + y) and Encrypt(x · y) are easy to compute from Encrypt(x) and
Encrypt(y)? Finding such an encryption function was the promise of a whole bunch of
applications,ranging from delegation of computation to untrusted parties to search on en-
crypted data. That is the reason why FHE is considered as the ”HOLY GRAIL” in cryp-
tography. Many attempts to produce such an encryption scheme have been made, but the
real breakthrough came with Gentry. He proposed the first fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) scheme (Gentry, 2009),based on ”ideal lattices”. His scheme later on was not
found practical, and researchers have been working to make FHE somewhat practical. The
major concern in FHE is that, the noise introduced in the ciphertext to ensure security,
increases with every single operation on the ciphertext lowering the accuracy of decryption
and, eventually leading to its failure. To address this issue, cryptographers use ”a hint”
in the key to help refreshing the ciphertext, or simply use long ciphertexts (with unused
bits). A somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) is a scheme in which no re-encryption
is required(no need to refresh the ciphertext), but only a limited number of operations is
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possible. An SHE is capable of evaluating ”low degree” polynomials homomorphically. All
known FHE encryption schemes are constructed from SHE. Thus, an FHE is obtained by
squashing the decryption circuit, that is to use an encrypted secret key as a component of
the public key and evaluate it under encryption by SHE. After squashing, the next step
towards FHE is bootstrapping, which is partially decrypting ((refreshed) the ciphertext,
and then use it in new homomorphic evaluations of low-degree polynomials. In this chap-
ter, we will present the mathematics behind the FHE, we will provide some background on
rings, fields, lattices then we will discuss two different FHE schemes based on lattices and
integers.
3.1.1 Rings and Polynomials
Definition 3.1.1.1. A ring R is a non-empty set together with two operations + and ·
satisfying:
(i) The associative law for addition (a+b)+c=a+(b+c) ∀a, b, c ∈ R
(ii) The commutative law for addition a+b=b+a
(iii) The existence of 0: ∃0 ∈ R such that,∀a ∈ Ra+ 0 = 0 + a = a
(iv) The existence of negatives: ∀a,∈ R ∃ − a ∈ R such that a+(-a)=0
(v) The associative law for multiplication (ab)c=a(bc) ∀a, b, c ∈ R
(vi) The distributive laws: a(b+c)=ab+ac, (a+b)c=ac+bc, ∀a, b, c ∈ R
A ring is said to be commutative if multiplication is commutative, i.e a · b = b · a,
where a, b∈ R
Example 3.1.1.1. (Z2,+, ·) is a ring.
More generally (Zp,+, ·) where + and · are respectively the addition and multiplication
modulo p
Definition 3.1.1.2. Let (R,+·) be a ring with identity and let x be an indeterminate over
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R. We denote by R[x] the set of all formal expressions
anx
n + an−1xn−1 + ....+ a1x+ a0 (2.1)
where n is a nonnegative integer and aj ∈ R for j=0,1,...n.
We define 1 · x = x and for any a ∈ R, a = ax0.
aj is called the coefficient of xj. Any expression of the form (2.1) is called a polynomial
in x with coefficients in R.
Example 3.1.1.2. a) Let consider the ring ( Z[x],+, ·) we define Z[x] the set of polyno-
mials with integer coefficients, Z[x] = {f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 + ..... + anxn|ai ∈ Z with
0 ≤ i ≤ n}. an is called the leading coefficient and a0 the constant term.
b) Similarly we define Zp[x] to be the set of polynomials with coefficients in Zp (p is
a prime) in the ring ( Zp[x],+, ·) , Zp[x] = {f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 + ..... + anxn|ai ∈ Zp
with 0 ≤ i ≤ n}.
We will be working with the ring (Zp[x],+, ·)
Definition 3.1.1.3. For every nonzero polynomial, p(x) ∈ R[x] , there is a largest non-
negative integer m(1 ≤ m ≤ n) such that am 6= 0 (recall that am is the coefficient of xm),
m is called the degree of p(x) and denoted deg(p(x)). am is called the the leading
coefficient of p(x), a0 is called the constant term of p(x)
A polynomial of the form akx
k is called a monomial
A nonzero polynomial p(x) with deg(p(x))=n is called a monic if an = 1
Definition 3.1.1.4. A division ring is a ring in which every nonzero element has a
multiplicative inverse.
A field is a commutative division ring.
Example: Zp with p prime is a field.
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Theorem
Let F be a field. The polynomial ring F[x] is a Euclidean domain. Specifically, if a(x) and
b(x) are two polynomials in F[x] with b(x) nonzero, then there are unique q(x) and r(x) in
F[x] such that a(x) = q(x)b(x) + r(x) with r(x) = 0 or degr(x) < deg(b(x).
Proof
• If a(x) = 0, then we take q(x) = r(x) = 0 and we have a(x) = q(x)b(x) + r(x)
• If a(x) 6= 0
let deg(a(x)) = n and deg(b(x)) = m, if n < m, then we take q(x) = 0 and r(x) = a(x)
and we have a(x) = 0.b(x) + a(x) , otherwise i.e n ≥ m, we have:
a(x) = anx
n + an−1xn−1 + ...+ a1x+ a0 and b(x) = bnxn + bn−1xn−1 + ...+ b1x+ b0
Then the polynomial a′(x) = a(x)− an
bm
xn−mb(x) is of degree less than n.
By induction then, there exists polynomials q′(x) and r(x) with a′(x) = q′(x)b(x) +
r(x) with r(x) = 0ordegr(x) < degb(x)
Then, letting q(x) = q′(x) +
an
bm
xn−m we have
a(x) = q(x)b(x) + r(x) with r(x) = 0 or deg r(x) < deg b(x)
Definition 3.1.1.5. Let g(x), h(x) ∈ Zp[x], where no both are zero. Then, greatest
common divisor of g(x) and h(x) denoted by gcd(g(x),h(x)) is the the unique monic
polynomial d(x) ∈ Zp[x] for which:
• d(x) divides both g(x) and h(x).
• if r(x) ∈ Zp[x] and r(x)|g(x), and r(x)|h(x) then r(x)|d(x)
Theorem Let F be a field and let f,g ∈ F[x] be any two nonzero polynomials. For
every polynomial d∈ F[x], the following properties are equivalent.
• (1) The polynomial d is the gcd of f and g
• (2) The polynomial d divides f and g and there exists u,v ∈ F[x] such that d = uf+vg
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Proof
Let d=gcd(f,g), then d|f → ∃α ∈ F[x] such that f = αd, similarly d divides g and g = βd,
thus f + g = (α+ β)d then d = λf + λg
Now let assume ∃u, v ∈ F[x] such that d=uf +vg, then if ∃h ∈ F[x] such that h divides
both u and v, then h must divide d, thus d=gcd(f,g).
Definition 3.1.1.6. If f(x) ∈ F [x] where F is a field, then a root of f(x) in F is an element
a∈ F with f(a) = 0
Lemma
Let F be a field and let f(x) ∈ F [x]. Then,for any a ∈ F , there exists q(x) ∈ F [x] such
that f(x) = (x− a)q(x) + f(a)
Proof
By the division algorithm, we have f(x) = (x−a)q(x)+r(x) where deg(r)<deg (x−a) = 1,
and therefore deg(r)=0,i.e r(x) = r is a constant.
So, f(x) = (x− a)q(x) + r ⇒ f(a) = (a− a)q(a) + r = r = r(x)
Definition 3.1.1.7. Let R be a ring. An ideal of R is a non-empty subset I of R with the
properties:
i)a,b ∈ I ⇒ a− b ∈ I
ii)a ∈ I and r ∈ R⇒ ra ∈ I
Definition 3.1.1.8. A principal Ideal I is an ideal generated by a single element. Let R
be a commutative ring( and x ∈ R, the principal ideal generated by x is the set < x >=
{rx |x ∈ R}
Example 3.1.1.3. I=< 2 > , is the set of vectors with all even coefficients.
Example 3.1.1.4. If p is prime, then the ring Zp[x] obtained by reducing Z[x] modulo the
prime ideal < p > is a principal ideal domain, since the coefficients lie in the field Zp[x] .
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Definition 3.1.1.9. Let R and S be rings :
A ring homomorphism is a map φ : R→ R satisfying :
(i) φ(a+ b) = φ(a) + φ(b)
(ii)φ(ab) = φ(a)φ(b) ∀a, b ∈ R
3.1.2 Lattices
Studies on lattices have been going on since the late eighteenth century by mathemati-
cians such as Lagrange, Gauss and later Minkowski. In 1996, Miklos showed in a seminal
result the use of lattices as cryptography primitives. He generated hard instances of lattices
problems which have been used as buildings blocks for lattice-based public-key cryptosys-
tems. We will start by studying in detail some properties of lattices and we will present
some underlying hard problems. Then we will present two lattice-based cryptosystems.
Definition 3.1.2.1. A nonempty set X ⊂ Rnis a vector space if x + y ∈ X and cx ∈
X∀x, y ∈ X and for all scalars c in Z .
If x1, x2, ...., xn ∈ Rn and c1, c2, ....ck are scalars, the linear combination
c1x1 + c2x2 + ...+ ckxk
is independent if
c1x1 + c2x2 + ...+ ckxk = 0⇒ c1 = c2 = ....ck = 0
Then we say {x1, x2, ....xk} is a set of linearly independent vectors∈ Rn
Let b1, b2, ...., bn be n linearly independent vector ∈ Rn , the lattice L in Rn generated
by them is defined as L=L(b1, b2, ...., bn)={
n∑
i=1
xibi, xi ∈ Z, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n}, the set of all linear
integer combinations of b1, b2, ...., bn
Equivalently , if we define B as the m× n matrix whose columns are b1, b2, ...., bn, then the
lattice generated by B is L=L(B)=L(b1, b2, ...., bn) = {Bx|x ∈ Zn} Any linearly independent
set of vectors that generates L is a basis for L. Every lattice has an infinite number of
29
lattice bases. We say that the rank of the lattice is n and its dimension is m. If n=m,
the lattice is called a full-rank lattice.
Example The lattice generated by {(1, 0)T , (0, 1)T} is Z2, the lattice of all integers points.
Another basis of Z2 is {(1, 0)T , (0, 1)T}, but {(1, 1)T , (2, 0)T} is not a basis for Z2
Definition 3.1.2.2. Let U ∈ Zn×n , with the property that ±det(U) , then we say that U
is unimodular.
Lemma Two n ×m matrices B and B’ generate the same lattice L iff and only if B
and B’ are related by a unimodular matrix, i.e B’=UB where U is a n× n matrix.
Proof
Let assume L(B)=L(B’), then for each of the n columns bi of B’, bi ∈ L(B). This
implies that there exists an integer matrix U ∈ Zn×n for which B’=BU. Similarly,
there exists V ∈ Zn×n such that B=B’V. Hence B’=BU=B’VU , and we get B′TB =
(V U)TB′TB′(V U). Taking determinants, we obtain that det(B′TB) = det(V U)2det(B′TB′)
and hence det(V)det(U)= ±1. Since V, U are both integer matrices, this means that
det(U) = ±1
Now let assume that B’=BU for some unimodular matrix U. Therefore each column of B’
is contained in L(B) and we get L(B′) ⊆ L(B). In addition , B = B′U−1, and since U−1 is
unimodular, we get that L(B′) ⊆ L(B). We conclude that L(B)=L(B’).
Since every lattice has an infinite number of bases, but not every set of n linear independent
vectors in Zn is a basis of Zn. How can we tell that a given set of vectors forms a basis for
a lattice?
Definition 3.1.2.3. Let L be a lattice of dimension n, and let b1, b2, ..., bn be a basis for
L.The fundamental domain (or fundamental parallelepiped) for L corresponding to this
basis is the set P (b1, b2, ..., bn) = {t1b1 + t2b2 + ....+ tnbn|x ∈ Rn,∀i : 0 ≤ ti < 1}
For a lattice basis B we define the half open fundamental parallelepiped for a lattice basis
B to be P (B) = {Bx|x ∈ Rn,∀i : −1
2
≤ xi < 1
2
}
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Lemma
Let L be a lattice of rank n, then b1, b2, ..., bn form a basis of L iff P (b1, b2, ..., bn)∩L = {0}
Proof
First, let assume that b1, b2, ..., bn form a basis of L. Then by definition, L is the set of all
their integer linear combinations. Since P (b1, b2, ..., bn) is defined as the set of all linear
combinations of b1, b2, ..., bn with coefficients in [0, 1), the intersection of the two sets is {0}
Now let assume, that P (b1, b2, ..., bn)∩L = {0}. Since L is a rank n lattice, and b1, b2, ..., bn
are linearly independent, we can write any lattice vector x ∈ L as ∑ yibi for some yi ∈ R.
Since, by definition a lattice is closed under addition, the vector x′ =
∑
(yi − [yi]bi) is also
in L. Then from our assumption, x′ = 0. This implies that all yi are integers and hence x
is an integer combination of b1, b2, ..., bn.
Let L(B) be a lattice of rank n. We define the determinant of L denoted det(L), as the
volume of the fundamental parallelepiped, it is also equal to the determinant of any basis
of L, namely vol(P(B)=det(L)=
√
BTB
In our context of lattice-based cryptography, there are ”good” and ”bad” bases of a
lattice. A basis B is said to be good, if the vectors are short and nearly orthogonal. For
any basis B, it is true that
∏n
i=1 ||bi|| ≥ det(L)
That means, for a good base we have
∏n
i=1 ||bi|| ∼ det(L)
Hermite Normal Form
Given a square n× n non singular integer matrix , there exists an n× n unimodular matrix
U and n× n matrix H such that AU = H. H is a lower triangular and is called the Hermite
Normal Form (HNF) of A:
i) hij = 0forj > i
ii) hii > 0 ∀ i and,
iii)hij ≤ 0 and |hij| < hii
Lemma: If B is the basis matrix of a lattice L, then HNF(B) is also a basis matrix for L.
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The HNF of a basis is unique and can be computed in polynomial time.
Definition 3.1.2.4. Let consider ~v = (v0, v1, ..., vn)
T of a polynomial v(x) ∈ R, we define
the cyclic rotation denoted by rot(~v), and rot(~v) := (−vn−1, v0, ..., vn−2)T
and its corresponding circulant matrixRot(v)= (~v, rot(~v), ..., rotn−1(~v)T , Rot(~v) is also
called the rotation basis of the ideal lattice < u >.
Example
let v(x) = 5x3 + 3x2 + 1, then rot(~v) = (−5, 1, 3)T and Rot(v) =

1 3 5
−5 1 3
−3 5 1
−1 3 5

3.1.3 Lattice-based cryptosystems
Let us describe the two following hard problems in lattices, used as security assump-
tions in the lattice-based cryptosystems.
For every n-dimensional lattice L, and i=1,2,...n, the ith successive minimum λi(L) is the
smallest radius r such that Ball(0,r)contains i linearly independent lattice vectors.
The shortest vector problem (SVP) is defined as: given a lattice L, find the nonzero
lattice vector ~v closest to the origin (||~v|| ≤ γλ1(L)), where γ is a factor depending on
the dimension of the matrix. This problem is considered particularly hard to solve for
γ ≥ nk, withk > 5.
Let dist(L, t) = min~v∈L{||t−v||} denote the minimum distance from the target vector
t to the lattice L.
For a vector ~v ∈ Rn, ~v (mod B) is the unique vector ~v” ∈ P (B) so that ~v − ~v” ∈ L,
that is ~v (mod B) = B[B−1~v] where [.] denotes the distance between the coefficients of
a vector and the nearest integers.
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The closest vector problem (CVP) is defined as: Given lattice L and target point t,
find lattice vector ~v closest to ~t: ||~v − ~t|| ≤ γ dist(L,t).
During the mid-1990’s, many cryptosystems were introduced whose underlying hard prob-
lem was SVP and | or CVP in a lattice of large dimension. The most interesting of those
were the GGHcrypstosystem of Goldreich, Goldwasser and Silverman. The motivation for
introducing these cryptosystems was mainly due to the fact that lattice-based cryptosys-
tems are frequently much faster than factorization or discrete logarithm based ones. RSA
for example, would require O(k3) operations to achieve k bits of security, while encryption
and decryption for lattice based require only O(k2) operations. Lattice-based cryptosys-
tems can also be associated with rings, allowing naturally additions and multiplications.
The GGH cryptosystem works as follow : Alice’s private key is a good basis for a lattice
L and her public key is a bad basis Bbad for L. Bob’s message is a binary vector m, which
he uses to form a linear combination
∑
mibi
bad of the vectors in Bbad. He then pertubes
the sum by adding a small random vector r. The resulting vector differs from a lattice
vector by the vector r. Since Alice knows a good basis for L, she can use Babai’s algorithm
to find v, and then she expresses v in terms of the bad basis to recover m. Trudy in the
other hand, knowing only the bad basis Bbad, would not be able to solve the closest vector
problem in L.
The N th degree truncated polynomial ring (NTRU) is another important lattice-
based cryptosystem based on polynomial rings. Let N, p,q be integers such that
gcd(N,q)=gcd(p,q)=1 and let define the following R = Z[x]/xN − 1, Rp = Zp[x]/xN − 1,
Rq = Zq[x]/xN − 1.
Definition 3.1.3.1. For any positive integers d1 and d2 we let T (d1, d2) = {a(x) ∈ R : a(x)
has d1 coefficients equal to 1, a(x) has d2 coefficients equal to −1, a(x) has all the other
coefficients equal to 0}.
Alice chooses public key (N, p,q,d). Alice’s private keys consists of two randomly
33
chosen polynomials f(x) ∈ T (d + 1, d) and g(x) ∈ T (d, d). Alice computes the inverse
Fq(x) = f(x)
−1 ∈ Rp. Then she computes h(x) = Fq(x)× g(x) ∈ Rq
. The polynomial h(x) is Alice’s public key and the pair (f(x), Fp(x)) is her private key. Bob
chooses a polynomial m(x) ∈ R whose coefficients ∈ (−p
2
,
p
2
), he also chooses a random
polynomial r(x) ∈ T (d, d). He, then computes e(x) = (ph(x) × r(x) + m(x)) mod q.
Alice started the decryption by computing a(x) = f(x) × e(x) mod q, then she computes
b(x) = Fp(x)× a(x) mod p and recover the message m(x) = b(x).
In the next section, we will describe the first FHE invented by Gentry. The construc-
tion has many parameters:
γ is the bit-length of the integers in the public key
Theorem: Babai’s closest vector algorithm
Let L ⊂ Rn be a lattice with basis b1, b2, ..., bn and let w ∈ Rn be an arbitrary vector. If
the vectors in the basis are sufficiently orthogonal to another, then the following solves the
”Closest Vector problem”:
write w = t1v1 + t2v2 + ...+ tnvn with t1, ..., tn ∈ R
set ai = [ti] for i=1,2,...,n
η is the bit-length of the secret key
ρ is the bit-length of the noise
τ is the number of integers in the public key
3.1.4 Gentry FHE
Craig Gentry proposed in 2009, the first fully homomorphic encryption based on ideal
in lattices. The Key generation algorithm takes as inputs a fixed ring R and a basis Bi. The
public key consists of a ”bad” basis Bpk of an ideal lattice J, along with some basis BI of a
small ideal I. A ciphertext is a vector close to a J-point, with the message being embedded
in the distance to the nearest lattice point. The plaintext space is R/I = {0, 1}n, for a
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message ~m ∈ {0, 1}n, we set ~e = 2~r + ~m for a random small vector ~r and then output the
ciphertext ~c ← ~e (mod B)pk. We will be working with R, the ring of integer polynomials
modulo fn(x), i.e R := Zp[x]/fn(x) where fn(x) = xn + 1 with n a power of two. We
will also consider the principal ideal I of R. We will denote by ~u = (u0, u1, ..., un)
T , the
coefficient vectors of u ∈ R
Generation of the keys of SHE
• Bob chooses a random polynomial u(x) = ∑n−1i=0 uixi ∈ Z[x], where each entry is a
η-bit integer, and he computes p=det (Rot(u(x))should be an odd integer.
• He computes d(x) = gcd(u(x), fn(x)) over Rp[x], and he finds α the unique root of
d(x).
Then he finds a polynomial v(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 vix
i ∈ Z[x] such that u(x)× v(x) = p mod
fn(x)
Remark: Not all polynomial u(x) ∈ Z[x] will work. We required that u(x) should be
such that HNF (J) = Rot(u(x)) has the following form:
HNF (J) =

p 0 0 ... 0
−α 1 0 ... 0
−α2 mod p 0 1 ... 0
... ... ...
−αn−1 mod p 0 0 ... 1

• The public key is pk = (p, α), and the secret key is sk = (p, v(x))
Now Bob is ready to encrypt his message and send it to Alice.
Encryption of the message
Bob chooses a small random polynomial (noise) and a messagem ∈ {0, 1}, then he computes
c = (2r(α) +m) mod p
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3.1.5 Smart-Vercauteren
In 2010, Nigel Smart and Frederick Vercauteren proposed a variant of Gentry scheme.
Their scheme is also based on lattices, but they succeeded in reducing the size of the
ciphertext and they length of the key. Their scheme also allows efficient fully homomorphic
encryption over any filed of characteristic two.
Generation of the keys of SHE
• Bob chooses a random polynomial u(x) = ∑n−1i=0 uixi ∈ Z[x], where each entry is a
η-bit integer, and he computes p=det (Rot(u(x))should be an odd integer.
• He computes d(x) = gcd(u(x), fn(x)) over Rp[x], and he finds α the unique root of
d(x).
Then he finds a polynomial v(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 vix
i ∈ Z[x] such that u(x)× v(x) = p mod
fn(x)
Remark: Not all polynomial u(x) ∈ Z[x] will work. We required that u(x) should be
such that HNF (J) = Rot(u(x)) has the following form and moreover p should be a
prime:
HNF (J) =

p 0 0 ... 0
−α 1 0 ... 0
−α2 mod p 0 1 ... 0
... ... ...
−αn−1 mod p 0 0 ... 1

• He computes β = (v(x)mod(x)) mod (2p)
Now his public key is pk = (p, α), and the secret key is sk(pβ)
Now Bob is ready to encrypt his message and send it to Alice.
36
Encryption of the message
Bob chooses a small random polynomial (noise) and a message m ∈ {0, 1}, then he com-
putes c = (2r(α) +m) mod p (Notice: The encryption is done bit by bit.)
Decryption of the message
Bob decrypts the ciphertext by computing: m = (c− [c× β/p+ 1
2
]) mod 2.
Alice can work on the encrypted values now, let define the addition and multiplication
Addition
Given the public key pk, and two ciphertexts c1 and c2 : c = c1 + c2 mod p
Multiplication
Given the public key pk, and two ciphertexts c1 and c2 : c = c1 × c2 mod p.
Let illustrate it by an example:
let n = 22 = 4, and u(x) = 2x3 + 4x2 + 8x+ 159 and fn(x) = x
4 + 1
Generation of the keys
p=det(Rot(u(x)) =

159 8 4 2
−2 −159 8 4
−4 −2 −159 8
−8 −4 −2 −159

=641407153
Now we want to find v(x) such that u(x) × v(x) = p mod f4(x) i.e u(x) × v(x) =
q(x)(x4 + 1) + p, we find v(x) = −40898x3 − 91520x2 − 204800x+ 4027071
Now we compute d(x) = gcd(u(x) = 2x3 + 4x2 + 8x + 159, x4 + 1)and we find d(x) =
x− 26912186
and the we find α = p− 26912186 = 614494967 (recall α is the root of d(x) modulo p)
so the public key is (641407153,614494967)
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Fully homomorphic properties of the scheme
Let c1 and c2 be two ciphertexts such that c1 = (2r1(α) +m1) mod p and c2 = (2r2(α) +
m2) mod p, and let m = m1 +m2.
c = c1 + c2 mod p⇒ c = (2r1(α) +m1) mod p+ (2r2(α) +m2) mod p
∃q, q′ ∈ Z such that c = pq + 2r1(α) +m1 + pq′ + 2r2(α) +m2,
then we have c = p(q + q′) +m1 +m2 + 2(r1(α) + 2r2(α)) ⇒ c = pq” +m1 +m2 + 2r(α)
with q”=q+q’ and r(α) = r1(α) + r2(α)
Decrypt(c) = (c − [c× β/p + 1
2
]) mod 2 = (pq” +m1 +m2 + 2r(α) − [(pq” +m1 +m2 +
2r(α))β/p) +
1
2
]) mod 2 = m1 +m2
Now let c′ = c1 × c2 mod p. and m = m1 ×m2
Similarly we get Decrypt(c) = m1 ×m2
3.1.6 Fully homomorphic encryption over integers
This encryption proposed by Van Djik and Gentry, is derived from the one suggested
by Gentry in 2009. It uses only elementary modular operations. The security of this scheme
relies on the difficulty to find approximate integer gcd, that is given a list of integers that
are near-multiples of a hidden integer, output that hidden integer.
Let define the following parameters:
γ is the bit-length of the integers in the public key
η is the bit length of the secret key which is the hidden approximate-gcd of all the public
key integers.
ρ is the bit length of the noise, that is the distance between the public key elements and
the nearest multiples of the secret key
τ is the number of integers in the public key
Description of the scheme
Step 1: Generation of the keys
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The secret key is an odd η bit integer , and p ∈ [2η−1, 2η)
Step 2:Encryption
Let m ∈ {0, 1}, then c = Encrypt(m, pk) = pq + 2r +m where r is a random integer 2r is
smaller than |1
2
|
Step 3: Decryption We recover the original message by doing Decrypt(c) = (c mod
p) mod 2.
In the next chapter we will present our implementation which is a combination of
these algorithms.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION
In this chapter we will describe our implementation. Our algorithm are based on the
Smart-Vercauteren approach. We have used the Brenner’s code and made some modifica-
tions and also the Fast LIbrary For Number Theory.
Key generation
The private and public keys we are generating are all prime
Input
The irreducible monic fn(x) = x
n+1 (irreducible in Z[x] for n=power of two). Practically,
the user enters the value of n.
We generate a random polynomial with the constant term odd with the requirement that
resultant (fn(x), g(x)) = p prime
The next step in finding the key is to apply the xgcd algorithm to (fn(x), g(x)) to find their
gcd and finally get its root.
Output
the pair (p, α) and the secret key q
Encryption
The encryption is done as described in Smart-Vercauteren scheme, that is c = (2r(α) +
m) mod p. In the encryption, we use the homomorphic properties of our scheme to
make our scheme more secure. Two bits with a same value would have two different
encryptions depending on the function we have chose, since Dec(Enc(1+0))=1+0=1 and
Dec(Enc(1.1))=1.1=1.
Decryption
The decryption is similar to the decryption of Smart- Vercauteren.
In this implementation we have reduced the size of the key to 512 bits, to make the
encryption runs in real time for visualization. It is not practical for real problems life.
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The next generation of FHE will allow multi-party computations. Our future work will
be to compare our implementation consumption of energy, since it is designed for smart
phones, it must be save energy efficiently.
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